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Abstract
This paper presents a model of how pitch
contours influence the illocutionary and
perlocutionary effects of utterances in con-
versation. Our account is grounded in
several insights from the prior literature.
Our distinctive contribution is to replace
earlier informal claims about the implica-
tures arising from intonation with logical
derivations: we validate inferences in the
SDRT framework that resolve the partial
meaning we associate with a pitch contour
to different specific interpretations in dif-
ferent contexts.
1 Introduction
In this paper, we give a formal semantics of pitch
contour in spoken dialogue, implemented in SDRT
(Asher and Lascarides, 2003). Our main claim is
that the pitch contour of an utterance conveys cog-
nitive attitudes, and that taking these attitudes into
account perturbs calculable implicatures. The fol-
lowing examples, adapted from Steedman (2000),
are cases in point:1
(1) A: You’re a millionaire.
a. B: I’m a MI
H*
LLIONAIRE .
LL%
b. B: I’m a MI
H*
LLIONAIRE?
LH%
c. B: I’m a MI
L*
LLIONAIRE?
LH%
(2) A: Are you rich?
a. B: I’m a MI
H*
LLIONAIRE?
LH%
The utterance in (1a) is an assertion with the ‘high
focus, final fall’ contour (H* LL%). Convention-
ally, this commits B to the proposition ‘B is a
millionaire’ and thereby establishes agreement be-
tween A and B. The same utterance with a final
rise (LH%) in (1b) is a question (‘Am I?’) that does
not make any such commitment. The low pitch
accent (L*) in (1c) additionally reveals that B is
1To describe our examples, we use the ToBI annotation
scheme throughout (Silverman et al., 1992).
somewhat surprised or doubtful about A’s asser-
tion (‘Am I? Really?’). While (2a) has exactly the
same form as (1b), in the context of (2) B does
make a commitment to being a millionaire, but
displays uncertainty on whether this answers A’s
question. These examples show that the intona-
tion of an utterance can influence both illocution-
ary and perlocutionary inferences: in (1b) an in-
dicative mood utterance is a clarification request,
and (1c) expresses the failure of belief transfer af-
ter an assertion. They also show that such infer-
ences are highly context-sensitive.
Our formal account makes specific, computable
predictions on what attitudes are displayed by
pitch, and when a particular pitch contour is li-
censed. It achieves this by leaving the composi-
tional semantics of pitch deliberately underspec-
ified, with contextual information and inference
supporting a specific and complete interpretation
in context. We believe that our model is novel
in its formal precision, with previous work resort-
ing to semi-formal paraphrases of how intonation
gives rise to implicatures.
Steedman (2014) formalises pitch contours in
terms of their effect on common ground, and
claims that the effects outlined above are deriv-
able from general principles of truth maintenance.
However, he does not give a formal account of
these derivations. Our model proposes a compo-
sitional semantics for individual pitch accents in
terms of public commitment; our semantic postu-
lates are inspired by Steedman’s, but we formally
derive their specific contribution in context. How-
ever, we abstract away from grammatical parsing
and assume that a grammar is in place which con-
nects to our semantics of pitch. This means that
we do not take the lexical placing of the focus ac-
cent into account and assume that the foreground
proposition of an utterance is computed elsewhere.
In the next section, we expand our informal dis-
cussion to further examples. We give a brief in-
troduction to the formal framework of SDRT in
section 3, including some amendments to SDRT’s
cognitive logic. We present our formal theory in
section 4 and show that it corresponds to the anal-
yses surveyed in section 2. In section 5 we con-
clude and give pointers towards further work.
2 Informal Discussion
The meaning of pitch contours in English has re-
ceived substantial attention in the literature. We
briefly review some prevalent discussions and use
them to motivate our formal model. The data we
present is not new: it is derived from a number of
earlier analyses that comprehensively survey the
phenomena we are interested in. Where we con-
structed an example for the sake of exposition, we
verified that our reading is in accordance with ear-
lier accounts.
2.1 Final Rise
We follow the discussion in Schlo¨der (2015). A
typical interpretation of the final rise in English
is that it signals ‘insufficiency’ in various senses.
Hobbs (1990) and Bolinger (1982) characterised
the meaning of a final rise as signalling ‘incom-
pleteness.’ Sˇafaˇrˇova´ (2005) has characterised this
incompleteness as displaying, i.a., an ‘uncertain
attitude.’ Westera (2013) has further specified such
uncertainty by relating it to the Gricean maxims:
the speaker displays an uncertainty regarding the
truthfulness (Quality), specificity (Quantity) or ap-
propriateness (Relation) of their utterance. Given
these observations, we characterise the final rise
as marking an utterance as incomplete, but con-
sider incompleteness itself to be an underspecified
notion, i.e., incompleteness can be resolved in dif-
ferent ways. The following two possible continu-
ations, adapted from Hirschberg and Ward (1995),
exemplify this variation in resolution:
(3) a. A: Where are you from?
b. B: I’m from SKO
H*
KIE .
LH%
c. B: That’s in Illinois.
c.’ A: Okay, good.
The final rise in (3b) is interpreted to signal in-
completeness. Specifically, B is uncertain if the
answer in (3b) pragmatically resolves A’s ques-
tion. Both follow-ups in (3c) and (3c’) resolve
this incompleteness in different ways: in (3bc), B
is supplying additional information himself, sig-
nalling that ‘Skokie’ is not the full answer, but that
‘Skokie, Illinois’ is. In (3bc’), B is waiting for A
to comment on whether she considers (3b) to be
sufficient. Thus in (3bc’), B’s utterance is taken
to have question force (in some sense), but can-
not be glossed as ‘am I? [from Skokie];’ rather, it
is ‘I’m from Skokie—does that answer your ques-
tion?’ So here, the incompleteness is resolved in
the dialogue as posing a question that needs be an-
swered by A. Similarly, the final rise in (1b) is in-
terpreted as a clarification request. However, its
illocutionary force can be paraphrased as ‘Am I?
[a millionaire].’ So a proposition p presented in
indicative mood with final rise can have the illo-
cutionary effect of the polar question ?p (‘Is it the
case that p?’) in some but not all contexts.
Hence, our basic idea to describe incomplete-
ness goes as follows: the final rise always projects
a follow-up, i.e., it demands some kind of resolu-
tion, but we leave open what kind of speech act is
being projected and what precisely its contribution
to the discourse is (cf. Malamud and Stephenson
(2011)). We then infer the specific illocutionary
force of the final rise utterance and of its follow-
up via a logic of defeasible inference that draws on
the compositional and lexical semantics of the ut-
terances involved. Where appropriate, we default
to clarification questions, i.e., our logical axioms
validate a defeasible inference that the preferred
follow-up to (1b) is a confirmation. But we leave
room to resolve the projection in another way in
different contexts, e.g., by elaboration in (3bc) or
acceptance in (3bc’).
2.2 Pitch Accents
We are primarily interested in the meaning of a
low pitch accent (L*). A typical interpretation of
the low pitch in English is that it indicates that be-
lief transfer has failed in some way: Hobbs (1990)
takes L* to indicate that the foreground proposi-
tion is either known or false, and Steedman (2000;
2014) takes it to mean that grounding fails. We are
also interested in the low pitch with high border
accents (H+L* and L*+H). Consider the follow-
ing possible responses in (4):
(4) A: France has a king!
a. B: France is a MO
L*
NARCHY .
LL%
‘It is not, this is obvious.’
b. B: France is a MO
H+L*
NARCHY .
LL%
‘It is not, this is obvious.’
c. B: # France is a MO
L*+H
NARCHY .
LH%
The utterances in (4a) and (4b) are intonated to
openly display sarcasm, and are hence disagree-
ing with A’s assertion. However, using the so-
called contradiction contour (cf. Liberman and Sag
(1974)) as in (4c) is incoherent. In dialogues
where—abstracting away from pitch—the seman-
tics of B’s response contradicts A’s, the felicity and
meaning change:2
(5) A: France has a king!
a. B: France is a REPU
L*
BLIC .
LL%
‘It is obviously a republic.’
b. B: # France is a REPU
H+L*
BLIC .
LH%
c. B: France is a REPU
L*+H
BLIC .
LH%
‘You are wrong, it is a republic.’
d. B: # France is a REPU
H*
BLIC .
LH%
e. B: # France is a REPU
H*
BLIC .
LL%
Unsurprisingly, the contradiction contour in (5c) is
licensed now. The L* pitch that earlier gave rise to
a sarcastic reversal of meaning now yields a rather
condescending correction in (5a), but (5b) is inco-
herent. Perhaps unexpectedly, a high pitch is also
incoherent here. Clearly, the question in (5d) can-
not be a clarification request, but the case for the
incoherence of (5e) is more opaque: speaker A as-
serts something, and B asserts the opposite. Prima
facie this is alright, but with these pitch contours
it seems as if A and B are talking past each other.
We conclude that while the low pitch generally
indicates a problem with belief transfer, its mean-
ing depends on its surrounding border accents:
the simple low pitch (L*) signals disagreement ir-
respective of the utterance’s actual propositional
meaning, whereas the complex pitches (H+L* and
L*+H) change meaning (and felicity).
Hobbs (1990) defines the effect of H* as mark-
ing the foreground proposition as ‘new.’ Since
‘not new’ to him means grounded or false, ‘new’
should denote ungrounded and true. Since, in di-
alogue, truth as far as the participants are con-
cerned takes precedence, we paraphrase Hobbs’
‘new’ instead as ‘uncontroversial.’ Steedman’s
(2014) gloss of the H* LL% contour is ‘I succeed
in making common ground that p.’ We are reluc-
tant to accept that a speaker can make a public
commitment for another speaker (pace Gunlogson
(2003)). Hence, one cannot individually succeed
in making something common ground, and we can
only consider Steedman’s gloss to mean that the
speaker assumes that belief transfer will succeed,
2The glosses/interpretations of the utterances in (4) and
(5) are our own. We additionally verified that they are consis-
tent with Steedman’s (2014) explanations of the grounding-
related effects of pitch contours.
i.e., that he has no reason to believe otherwise. We
again can paraphrase this as ‘p is uncontroversial.’
This link from H* to ‘uncontroversial’ explains the
incoherence of (5d) and (5e): after A commits to
France having a king, the proposition ‘France is a
republic’ cannot be considered uncontroversial.
Example (6), taken from Ladd (1980), shows
that intonation has more subtle effects when we
are interested in more nuanced differences than as-
sent vs. contradiction.
(6) A: Harry’s the biggest liar in town.
a. B: The biggest FOO
H*
L maybe.
LL%
b. B: The biggest FOO
L*+H
L maybe .
LH%
The contour (6a) has B agreeing with A’s assertion
by elaborating it, i.e., B is publicly committed to
Harry being both the biggest liar and maybe the
biggest fool. The contour in (6b) does not commit
B to Harry being the biggest liar, but it is not an
outright denial either. Instead, B is committed to
Harry being the biggest fool, and that this makes
‘Harry is the biggest liar’ less believable. Hence,
the utterance in (6b) has a different illocutionary
force than (6a), and attaches to the discourse as
counterevidence.
While the H* LH% contour in (7a) again dis-
plays uncertainty, the examples in (7b,c) reveal
something new about the low pitch: B conveys
something about how his beliefs have changed in
the aftermath of A making her previous utterance:
(7) A: Did you read the first chapter?
a. B: I read the THI
H*
RD chapter?
LH%
‘Does that suffice?’
b. B: I read the THI
L*+H
RD chapter?
LH%
‘Wasn’t I supposed to read the third?’
c. B: I read the whole DISSERTA
L*+H
TION .
LL%
‘And you should know that I did.’
In (7b), B believed it to be common ground that
he is to read the third chapter, and in (7c) he be-
lieved that A knew that he had read the whole dis-
sertation. To make sense of these perlocutions, a
listener needs to draw inferences of the form ‘be-
fore A said u, B must have believed p.’ Such rea-
soning is also useful to describe the meaning of
contours signalling surprise. In the next section,
we describe how we formalise such hindsights in
SDRT’s cognitive modelling logic.
3 Framework
Our theory of pitch contours is implemented
in Segmented Discourse Representation Theory
(Asher and Lascarides, 2003; Lascarides and
Asher, 2009). Our rationale goes as follows.
SDRT models back-and-forth information flow
between three interconnecting languages and as-
sociated logics: the language of information con-
tent, the glue logic, and the cognitive modelling
logic. By manipulating this information flow, we
gain fine-grained control over different aspects of
an utterance’s interpretation, allowing us to model
perturbations of the standard interpretations. Each
of the logics in SDRT is designed for a specific
task, and we briefly describe each of them in turn.
The language of information content is used to
express the logical form of a discourse, capturing
its pragmatically resolved, specific interpretation.
The dynamic semantics of this language models
the truth conditions of the public commitments
that speakers make through their utterances. The
language of information content includes rhetor-
ical relations (e.g., Explanation or Elaboration)
that connect the representations of individual dis-
course units.
A logical form in SDRT is an SDRS: a set of
labels Π, where each label stands for a discourse
segment, and a mapping F from each label in Π
to a formula representing that segment’s content
(we will sometimes write F(pi) as Kpi). Since
these formulae include rhetorical relations among
labels, F imposes an ordering on Π: pi1 immedi-
ately outscopes pi2 if F(pi2) features R(pi1, pi) or
R(pi, pi2) as one of its conjuncts. We write pi  pi′
for the transitive closure of this relation. A well-
formed SDRS imposes the constraint that this par-
tial order is rooted, i.e., there is a single discourse
segment consisting of rhetorically connected sub-
segments.
In dialogue, participants make public commit-
ments to SDRSs. Specifically, the logical form of
a dialogue turn is a set of SDRSs, one for each di-
alogue participant. When a speaker utters a unit
pi, he commits to the rhetorical relation that con-
nects pi to the prior context. In effect, this makes
speakers publicly committed to the illocutionary
contribution of their moves. The logical form of
a dialogue is the logical forms of its turns. For
example, the logical form of (8) is as follows:
(8) A: Max fell.
B: John pushed him.
Turn A’s SDRS B’s SDRS
1 pi1 : fall(e,m) ∅
2 pi1 : fall(e,m) pi : Explanation(pi1, pi2)
pi2 : push(e′, j,m)
The dynamic semantics of Explanation(pi1, pi2)
entails the contents of pi1 and pi2 in dynamic con-
junction, and that the latter answers the question
‘why is pi1 true?’ Being publicly committed to
Explanation(pi1, pi2) thus makes B publicly com-
mitted to the content of pi1. This means that A and
B agree that Max fell—they share a public com-
mitment to it—even though this is an implicature
of B’s contribution and not linguistically explicit.
There are several parts of the logical form of (8)
that go beyond the compositional and lexical se-
mantics of its individual units: the pronoun ‘him’
is resolved to m, and the illocutionary contribu-
tion of B’s utterance is to provide an Explanation
to A’s. These inferences are about the construc-
tion of logical form (as opposed to their truth).
As input, they take underspecified logical forms
(ULFs), which are in turn computed from an utter-
ance’s linguistic surface form. This construction is
modelled in the glue logic which we discuss next.
The glue logic validates defeasible inferences
from partial descriptions of logical forms (i.e.,
ULFs) to fully specified discourses (i.e., SDRSs
like those in 8). SDRSs capture the pragmatically
preferred and complete interpretation of the dis-
course. These inferences are facilitated by axioms
of the following form:
(λ :?(α, β) ∧ Info(α, β)) > λ : R(α, β).
The > denotes a default conditional and we use
Greek letters to label discourse segments. So, in-
formally, the above formula says: ‘if α and β are
rhetorically connected to form a part of the ex-
tended discourse segment λ, and their ULFs satisfy
Info, then normally, their rhetorical connection is
R.’ Such default axioms are justified by word
meaning, world knowledge and cognitive states.
The default conditional > yields a nonmono-
tonic proof theory |∼G. To ensure that the glue
logic remains decidable, it reasons about ULFs
(i.e., the (partial) form of a logical form), but has
only limited access to what those logical forms
mean in the logic of information content. Keep-
ing the glue logic decidable accounts for how peo-
ple by and large agree on what was said, if not on
whether it is true.
The glue logic also has access to information
in the cognitive modelling logic. This logic in-
cludes a number of modal operators: KD45 modal
operators for beliefs (BS for a speaker S); K45
operators for public commitment (PS); and spe-
cial modal operators for intentions (IS).3 Also, for
each action term δ, there are two modal operators
[δ] (‘after δ’) and [δ]−1 (‘before δ’); see Asher and
Lascarides (2008) for a discussion of this logic.
The only action term we will be concerned with
is the act of uttering something, δ = sS(pi) for an
utterance label pi and its speaker S. For our pur-
poses, these operators are sufficiently specified by
postulating the following axioms:
Glue to Cognitive Logic (GL to CL).
Let pi1 . . . pin be elementary discourse units spo-
ken by S1 . . . Sn, and Γn be the context after pin
(i.e., their ULFs plus facts and axioms). Let |−G,
|∼G be the monotonic and nonmonotonic proof
theories of the glue logic. Let |−C and |∼C be
the ones for the cognitive modelling logic.
If Γn|−Gϕ, then
Γn|−C [sS1(pi1)] . . . [sSn(pin)]PSnϕ.
If Γn|∼Gϕ, then
Γn|∼C [sS1(pi1)] . . . [sSn(pin)]PSnϕ.
Persistence.
If Γ|∼CPAϕ and A 6=S, then Γ|∼C [sS(pi)]PAϕ.
A person’s public commitments are unaffected
by another speaker’s utterance.
Hindsight.
If Γn|∼C [sS1(pi1)] . . . [sSn(pin)][sSi(pii)]−1BSϕ,
then Γn|∼C [sS1(pi1)] . . . [sSi−1(pii−1)]BSϕ.
‘Before’-operators cancel up to a corresponding
‘after’-operator.
Conservativity.
([sS(pi)]BS′ϕ)→ (BS′ϕ∨BS′((PSKpi)>ϕ)).
Beliefs after an utterance are either carried over
from before, or are inferred from that utterance.
Reduction.
(BS′ [sS(pi)]ϕ) > ([sS(pi)]BS′ϕ), and
(BS′ [sS(pi)]
−1ϕ) > ([sS(pi)]−1BS′ϕ).
Beliefs usually transfer to hindsight and fore-
sight judgements, i.e., if a speaker believes that
after/before the act pi, the proposition ϕ holds,
they have that belief in foresight/hindsight.
The axioms GL to CL and Persistence together en-
sure that glue logic inferences about the illocution-
ary act that a speaker performs matches their (cur-
rent) public commitments in the cognitive logic;
so if A has asserted that p then in the cognitive
logic A is publicly committed to p. Conversely,
3Glossing over the details, we write IABBϕ if A wants B
to believe that ϕ, and IAPBϕ if A wants B to commit to ϕ.
defeasible inferences made in the glue logic can
also be blocked by facts from the cognitive mod-
elling logic, e.g., if Γ `C PS¬ϕ, then the glue
logic cannot defeasibly infer a discourse relation
in S’s SDRS that would entail ϕ.
Note that the context Γn in Hindsight does
not change. The axiom models inferences that
interlocutors can make about previous cognitive
states from their current knowledge Γn, which ex-
tends their prior knowledge Γi−1. In particular,
it is possible that the axiom applies in Γn, but
that Γi−1 6|∼C [sS1(pi)] . . . [sSi−1(pii−1)]BSϕ. Also
note that the hindsight-inferences formalised by
the Hindsight and Reduction axioms are scoped
by a belief modality. Since defaults support be-
lief revision (i.e., it is possible that Γ|∼BSϕ while
Γ∧ψ|∼BS¬ϕ), the above axioms support revision
in hindsight. We go more in-depth on these phe-
nomena in the next section.
4 Formal Model of Pitch Contours
We now give a precise, formal account of the ef-
fects we discussed in section 2. We first give a
brief account of cooperative principles in SDRT
and how they are used to compute the perlocu-
tionary effects of utterances. This initial presen-
tation will discuss the standard (unperturbed) in-
ferences. We then present our semantics for pitch
contours, and afterwards show how we derive their
pragmatic effects.
4.1 The Standard Reasoning
Our main concern are the perlocutionary contri-
butions of pitch contours, which we model in
SDRT’s cognitive modelling logic. In SDRT, such
effects (like belief transfer) are specified by stip-
ulating axioms affecting the cognitive models of
the speakers (Asher and Lascarides, 2003; Asher
and Lascarides, 2013). The following axioms give
a Gricean account of cooperativity:
Sincerity (a). PSϕ > BSϕ.
Sincerity (b). BS¬ϕ > ¬ISPSϕ.
Cooperativity. PSISϕ > IHϕ.
Intention Transfer. PSϕ > PSISPHϕ.
Sincerity states that public commitments are usu-
ally truthful regarding the interlocutor’s beliefs,
Cooperativity that publicly announced intentions
are usually adopted by their addressee, and Inten-
tion Transfer that a public commitment is usually
intended to be grounded, i.e., to become a shared
public commitment. In SDRT, both interlocutors
maintain their own private model of the cognitive
modelling logic, i.e., their individual representa-
tion of the public commitments, beliefs and inten-
tions of everybody involved in the conversation.
We assume that everyone agrees on the above ax-
ioms, and that this fact is mutually known.
As an example, suppose that a speaker S asserts
p to a hearer H. By GL to CL, S and H infer PSp
in the cognitive model. Then, H can infer that S
actually believes that p by Sincerity. Further, both
can infer by Intention Transfer that S wants H to
make the same commitment, i.e., PSISPHp. By
Cooperativity the speaker S can infer that IHPHp
and so expects an agreement move (establishing
H’s commitment to p) next.
4.2 Final Rise
Based on our discussion in section 2, we take the
final rise to have an influence on: (i) the structure
of the dialogue by demanding a follow-up (incom-
pleteness); (ii) the illocutionary force of an utter-
ance (e.g., an inferred question force); and (iii) the
inferred attitudes of the speaker (uncertainty). We
refine the model of Schlo¨der (2015). The follow-
ing mapping formalises incompleteness:4
Semantics of the Final Rise.
pi(LH%) 7→ pi′ = ? ∧ pi′′ = ? ∧R = ?
∧ R(pi′, pi′′) ∧ pi′  pi.
That is, the final rise semantics enforces that there
is a yet unknown follow-up response standing in
some relation to the final rise unit pi. We leave
open what discourse relation is projected, and we
allow it to attach to a wider discourse segment as
long as it includes pi as a part. This is required to
model cases where it is the discourse relation itself
that is uncertain. For example, in (3bc’), where A
accepts the Question-Answer-Pair (QAP) relation
itself (i.e., that 3b answers her question 3a), and
not just the contents of (3b). That is, A’s move is
Accept(pi, c), where pi : QAP(a, b). In (3bc), how-
ever, the projected relation is Elaboration(b, c),
directly attaching to the final rise utterance (3b).
In addition, we stipulate a glue logic axiom that,
where truth-conditionally appropriate, defeasibly
infers from a final rise that a question is being
asked. The following rule serves to interpret an in-
dicative mood utterance with content p as the polar
question ?p (as in example 1a):5
4cf. Pierrehumbert and Hirschberg (1990): ‘to interpret an
utterance with particular attention to subsequent utterances.’
5Note that if an utterance is in interrogative mood, then
the axioms of Asher and Lascarides (2003) will already sup-
Clarification from Final Rise.(
β : LH% ∧ λ : ?(α, β) ∧2(Kα → prop(Kβ))
)
> λ : CR(α, β).6
In this axiom, pi : LH% means that the label pi in-
cludes the final rise semantics. So this axiom stip-
ulates that if an utterance has a final rise, and its
core propositional content is entailed by that of its
attachment point, then normally, it is a clarifying
polar question.7 The entailment Kα → prop(Kβ)
is required to explain the incoherence of (9b):
(9) A: You are rich.
a. B: I’m rich? ‘Am I?’
b. B: # I’m a millionaire?
(10) A: You are a millionaire.
a. B: I’m rich? ‘Am I?’
b. B: I’m a millionaire? ‘Am I?’
Both answers in (10) are licensed because, con-
ventionally, ‘millionaire’ implies ‘rich,’ hence the
question in (10a) is reasonable. Conversely, ‘rich’
does not necessarily imply ‘millionaire’, so B’s ut-
terance in (9b) does not support an interpretation
as a clarification request. Lastly, we model ‘uncer-
tainty’ in SDRT’s cognitive modelling logic. Here,
the functions S(pi) and H(pi) map a label to its
speaker and hearer, respectively.
Cognitive Contribution of the Final Rise.
pi : LH% ∧ λ : R(α, pi) ∧ ¬pi : ?prop(Kpi)
> PS(pi)¬BS(pi)IH(pi)PH(pi)R(α, pi).
This stipulates that if the utterance with the final
rise directly attaches to an antecedent, but is not a
question,8 then the speaker publicly displays un-
certainty about whether the hearer is willing to
commit to that relation. This is in particular true if
the relation is Correction (as in, e.g., 5c), but also
applies to uncertain answers as in (3b).
As discussed in section 4.1, the combined ap-
plication of Cooperativity and Intention Transfer
would normally yield IH(pi)PH(pi)R(α, pi), i.e., the
hearer will establish a shared commitment on the
discourse relation R in the next turn. The cogni-
tive contribution of the final rise conveys that the
speaker S was unable to make that inference—for
whatever reason. We take this to be the underspec-
ified uncertainty that a final rise communicates.
port an inference that the utterance has the force of a question.
6CR ' Clarification Request. CRs have question seman-
tics, i.e., pi : ?Kpi , and are sincere (not rhetorical): ¬PSKα∧
¬PS¬Kα. CR has the dynamic semantics of elaborating
questions (Asher and Lascarides, 2003, p. 468).
7It is necessary to map Kβ to its propositional content, as
once question force is inferred, Kβ is a question.
8On questions, the final rise is part of the default contour
and cannot be taken to convey uncertainty.
4.3 Pitch Accents
We only discuss the cognitive functions of nuclear
pitch accents, abstracting away from pre-nuclear
pitches and lexical position. We are furthermore
only concerned with pitch accents on indicative ut-
terances (including those interpreted as questions),
but not with interrogatives. We stipulate the fol-
lowing cognitive contributions (we simplify nota-
tion by setting S = S(pi), H = H(pi)):
Cognitive Contributions of Nuclear Accents.
- pi(H∗) 7→ PS(¬BSBH¬Kpi).
‘I don’t think what I’m saying is controversial.’
- pi(H+L∗) 7→ PS(¬ISPSKpi).
‘I’m not committing to what I just said.’
- pi(L∗) 7→λ : ?(α, pi)→
(
PS
(¬ISPSKα)
∧ PS
(
[sH(α)]
−1BS¬IHPHKα
))
.
‘I didn’t think you’d want to commit to what
you just said, and I’m unwilling to.’
- pi(L∗+H) 7→ λ :?(α, pi)→
(
PS
(
BSBH¬Kpi
)
∧ PS
(
[sH(α)]
−1¬BSBH¬Kpi
))
.
‘I didn’t think what I’m saying is controversial,
but now I do.’
Note that the postulate for H* states that the
speaker S assumes that belief transfer, as for-
malised by the successive application of Inten-
tion Transfer and Cooperativity, will succeed. To
be precise, if S’s cognitive model would include
BSBH¬Kpi, then S would infer by Sincerity (b)
that BS¬IHPHϕ, and would hence believe that
Cooperativity would not apply, i.e., S would not
expect an agreement move next. Intonating H* is
therefore the default pitch insofar that S explic-
itly communicates that she sees no reason why
the standard grounding process should not obtain,
yielding the implicature ‘I expect you to agree.’
Such an expectation is unwarranted if the utter-
ance is a correction move; in section 4.4 we show
how this explains the incoherence of (5e).
Conversely, the first conjunct of the L*+H con-
tribution has the speaker conveying the opposite:
she assumes that her utterance’s content is contro-
versial. Accordingly, the L*+H contour features
prominently in utterances that put two proposi-
tions in contrast, e.g., in denials. We give a for-
malisation of example (6b) in section 4.4.
In the first clause of the L* contribution, how-
ever, a speaker is explicitly announcing that the
Cooperativity axiom has failed on their side of the
model, and belief transfer on H’s earlier statement
(labelled α) has failed. The cognitive contribution
of the H+L* pitch has the same form, but relates
to the current utterance (labelled pi): the speaker
is indicating that she does not intend that her own
utterance’s contents be grounded. 9 If the propo-
sitional content of pi is the same as that of α, the
result is a sarcastic rejection (as in 4b). Usually,
such a rejection is taken to mean that the speaker
actually believes the opposite. Hence we include
the following negation-strengthening axiom:
Sarcasm. PS¬ISPSϕ > PS¬ϕ.
This reads as follows: if someone makes the ex-
plicit public commitment to not make a particular
commitment, they are usually taken to commit to
the opposite. This accounts for the actual rever-
sal of meaning in a sarcastic utterance, instead of
a mere refusal to ground. In the next section, we
show how this axiom separates the sarcastic rejec-
tion (4a) from the loaded question (1c).
What is left to discuss are the second clauses
of the L* and L*+H contributions, respectively.
These clauses convey something about earlier be-
liefs, allowing for hindsight inferences. By ut-
tering something, a speaker incurs a public com-
mitment and the second clause of the L* contri-
bution conveys that the next speaker did not ex-
pect this commitment. The second clause of the
L*+H contribution relates to an utterance’s con-
tent being thought uncontroversial, but that belief
has now changed—thereby allowing inferences on
the speaker’s beliefs before the utterance in hind-
sight.
4.4 Applications
We now verify derivations of the effects of pitch
contours for four of our earlier examples.
Ex. (5e) A: France has a king!
B: # France is a REPU
H*
BLIC .
LL%
From A’s utterance we can infer:
Γ|−[sA(α)][sB(pi)]2(Kα → ¬Kpi) (fact).
Γ|−[sA(α)]PAKα (GL to CL).
Γ|∼[sA(α)][sB(pi)]PAKα (Persistence), hence
Γ|∼[sA(α)][sB(pi)]PA¬Kpi.
Γ|∼[sA(α)][sB(pi)]BA¬Kpi (Sincerity)
Γ|∼BB[sA(α)][sB(pi)]BA¬Kpi
(axioms are mutually believed).
9cf. Steedman (2014) ‘I fail to make it common ground.’
Γ|∼[sA(α)][sB(pi)]BBBA¬Kpi (Reduction).
From B’s utterance, including its H*, we get:
Γ|−[sA(α)][sB(pi)]PB¬BBBA¬Kpi
Γ|∼[sA(α)][sB(pi)]BB¬BBBA¬Kpi (Sincerity).
Γ|∼[sH(α)][sB(pi)]¬BBBA¬Kpi (B is KD4510).
Hence we infer that one of A or B are insin-
cere. Since it is indeterminable to an overhearer
who is insincere, i.e., which application of Sincer-
ity is blocked, the dialogue appears incoherent.
Ex. (6b) A: Harry’s the biggest liar in town.
B: The biggest FOO
L*+H
L maybe .
LH%
The intended reading is that B is putting his utter-
ance in contrast to A’s utterance. We start with the
second conjunct of the L*+H semantics:
Γ|−[sA(α)][sB(pi)]PB
(
[sAα]
−1¬BBBA¬Kpi
)
.
Γ|∼[sA(α)][sB(pi)]BB
(
[sAα]
−1¬BBBA¬Kpi
)
(Sincerity).
Γ|∼[sA(α)][sB(pi)][sAα]−1BB¬BBBA¬Kpi
(Reduction).
Γ|∼BB¬BBBA¬Kpi (Hindsight).
Γ|∼¬BBBA¬Kpi (B is KD45)11 (∗).
Now, the first conjunct of the model for L*+H:
Γ|−[sA(α)][sB(pi)]PB
(
BBBA¬Kpi
)
.
Γ|∼[sA(α)][sB(pi)]BB
(
BBBA¬Kpi
)
(Sincerity).
Γ|∼[sA(α)][sB(pi)]BB
(
BA¬Kpi
)
(B is KD45).
Γ|∼[sA(α)]
(
BBBA¬Kpi
∨BB(PBKpi > BA¬Kpi)
)
(Conservativity).
Γ|∼[sA(α)]BBBA¬Kpi (∨-elimination).12
Γ|∼BB
(
PAKα>BA¬Kpi
)
(Conservativity + ∗).
; ‘That you told me he is a liar tells me that you
don’t think he is a fool.’
Ex. (4a) A: France has a king!
B: France is a MO
L*
NARCHY .
LL%
By the first conjunct of the model for L*:
Γ|−[sA(α)][sB(pi)]PB¬IBPBKα.
Γ|∼[sA(α)][sB(pi)]PB¬Kα (Sarcasm).
; ‘You are wrong.’
10KD45 models introspection, i.e., BBϕ → BBBBϕ.
Hence, if BB¬BBϕ, then BBϕ must fail.
11The analoguous derivation for examples (7b) and (7,c)
accounts for the ‘I thought you knew’ implicature.
12By Int. Transfer+Cooperativity, PBKpi|∼ IAPAKpi , and
by Sincerity (b), BA¬Kpi|∼¬IAPAKpi , hence the second
disjunct normally does not apply.
This inference channels back into the glue
logic, which now validates the discourse relation
Correction(α, pi), entailing ¬Kα, in B’s SDRS.
Also, similar to the derivation of (∗), applying
Sincerity, Hindsight and Reduction to the second
conjunct yields:
Γ|−[sA(α)][sB(pi)]PB[sA(α)]−1BB¬IAPAKα.
Γ|∼BB¬IAPAKα.
; ‘I thought you wouldn’t say that.’
In sum, B is communicating to A in (4a) that he
is correcting A and that he did not expect that he
would have to do so.
Ex. (1c) A: You’re a millionaire.
B: I’m a MI
L*
LLIONAIRE?
LH%
Here, B’s utterance has question force, but it is
read with a bias towards the negative answer. First,
the axiom Clarification from Final Rise renders
B’s utterance as a CR. Hence, the cognitive contri-
bution of the final rise does not apply. Now, con-
sider the second conjunct of the L* contribution
and apply, as before, Reduction and Hindsight:
Γ|∼BB¬IAPAKα
; ‘I thought you wouldn’t say that’ (≈ surprise).
Then, by the first conjunct of the model for L*:
Γ|−[sA(α)][sB(pi)]PB¬IBPBKα.
; ‘I’m unwilling to agree with what you just said.’
In contrast to (4a), Sarcasm cannot be applied
here, because it is blocked by the dynamic seman-
tics for clarification requests (CRs must be sincere
questions). Hence, A is not communicating that B
is wrong, but just that B is not ready to agree.
5 Conclusion
We have presented a unified, formal account of the
perlocutionary effects of pitch contours in collo-
quial English as discussed in the literature. The
novel contribution of our model is the formal
derivability of these effects. Our stipulations of
cognitive effects are independently motivated and
in line with previous analyses of these effects. By
connecting them with the logics of SDRT, we ob-
tain concrete derivations of implicatures commu-
nicated by pitch. In future work, we plan to ex-
tend this analysis to interrogatives and impera-
tives. Further, we have ignored the focus effects
of the lexical placement of pitch accents here. To
integrate these effects into our account, we plan to
extend SDRT’s glue and cognitive logics to rea-
soning with the contents of sub-clausal units.
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